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Our understanding about the functionality of the brain’s default network (DN) has significantly 
evolved over the past decade. Whereas traditional views define this network based on its 
suspension/disengagement during task-oriented behaviour, contemporary accounts have 
characterised various situations wherein the DN actively contributes to task performance. 
However, it is unclear how different task-contexts drive componential regions of the DN to 
coalesce into a unitary network and fractionate into different sub-networks. Here we report a 
compendium of evidence that provides answers to these questions. Across multiple analyses, 
we found a striking dyadic structure within the DN in terms of the profiles of task-triggered 
fMRI response and effective connectivity, significantly extending beyond previous inferences 
based on meta-analysis and resting-state activities. In this dichotomy, one subset of DN regions 
prefers mental activities interfacing with perceptible events, while the other subset prefers 
activities detached from perceptible events. While both show a common ‘aversion’ to sensory-
motoric events, their differential preferences manifest a subdivision that sheds light upon the 
taxonomy of the brain’s memory systems. This dichotomy is consistent with proposals of a 
macro-scale gradational structure spanning across the cerebrum. This gradient increases its 
representational complexity, from primitive sensory-motoric processing, through lexical-



















The discovery of the brain’s default network (DN) epitomises the serendipity of science. In the 
fledging period of human functional neuroimaging, researchers primarily employed externally-
oriented tasks (e.g., visual search, speech recognition, or finger tapping) to demarcate and 
catalogue brain regions responsive to external stimuli. The serendipitous discovery of the DN 
is consequent to using passive viewing (rest) as a contrasting baseline – some early studies 
observed that a set of brain regions, including the angular gyri and midline structures (medial 
prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices), reliably exhibit heightened activity during passive 
moments yet become deactivated during active tasks (e.g., Andreasen et al. 1995). This task-
negative resting-state activity was initially treated as an inadequacy of experimental design that 
failed to control for confounding variables (for discussion, see Buckner 2012). The turning 
point in the field’s conceptualisation about the DN’s functionality came when Raichle et al. 
published their trailblazing work in 2001 – rather than treating the DN’s activity as a failure of 
designing a proper baseline, Raichle et al. postulated that the task-negative regions collectively 
contribute to human cognition when the mind is disengaged from external tasks and returns to 
the ‘default mode’ (rest) (Raichle et al. 2001). After their seminal work, subsequent research 
found that the ebb and flow of neural activities in DN regions tend to synchronise, forming a 
cohesively oscillating network (e.g., Greicius et al. 2003). It is now well-established that DN 
activity increases during various introspectively-focused tasks (e.g., reminiscing the past, 
envisaging the future, reflecting on self, and empathising with others; Kelley et al. 2002; Saxe 
and Kanwisher 2003; Spreng and Grady 2010). Subsequent research that combines fMRI and 
experience-sampling (a behavioural protocol that intermittently probes thoughts) have 
provided more definitive measures linking the occurrence of subjective experiences (mind 
wandering) with DN activity (Christoff et al. 2009). Recent research has further demonstrated 
that reliance on internally-constructed representations (from brief memoranda kept in working 
memory to lengthy episodes of long-term memory) might be a crucial factor that regulates the 
degree of the DN’s involvement. For example, whereas DN activity is abated by decisions 
guided using immediately perceivable inputs, it is enhanced by decisions guided using contents 
of working memory (Murphy et al. 2018; Murphy, Wang, et al. 2019). This argues against an 
oversimplified definition based on the DN’s absence during externally-focused tasks, and 
instead emphasises its active participation in circumstances wherein task performance is 
sustained by internally-constructed representations. Despite significant progress over the past 
decades, the complicated relationship between the DN and different types of introspective 




It is now apparent that the once prevailing ‘task-rest’ dichotomy is inaccurate in describing the 
DN’s functionality. Updated frameworks have been proposed to accentuate its role in granting 
conscious access to memories and thoughts, untethering the human mind from the immediate 
here-and-now (e.g., Buckner and DiNicola 2019). However, we still lack an encompassing 
framework to account for its omnipresent involvement in different types of introspective 
activities, as well as the nuanced subdivision within this network in relation to different tasks. 
To tackle these challenges, various attempts have been made (i) to parcellate the brain into 
functionally distinct networks and (ii) to uncover the cardinal organising principles with which 
brain networks join forces or split up. For instance, based on the brain’s task-free intrinsic 
connectivity and hierarchical clustering, it has been shown that the whole-brain’s inherent 
connectivity fractionates into seven primary networks (Yeo et al. 2011; note that other schemes 
of parcellation have been used, resulting in different numbers of sub-networks), and the DN 
could be further partitioned into multiple sub-networks with them preferentially associated with 
different tasks (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010). While such evidence demonstrates the 
heterogeneity of functional brain modules both at macro-scale (whole-brain) and meso-scale 
(within the DN), it remains unclear whether there is a cardinal organising dimension along 
which networks serving similar purposes unite while networks serving distinct purposes 
bifurcate. However, some recent studies offer clues that this organising dimension exists and, 
more importantly, operates as a general principle at multiple levels: First, Margulies et al. 
showed that the whole-brain’s complex connectivity pattern can be condensed into a 
topographical polarity that explains a large proportion of cerebral layout, with regions serving 
outwardly-oriented activities (perception and action) on one end of the spectrum and regions 
serving introspective activities on the other end (Margulies et al. 2016). A similar structure, 
albeit more rudimentary, is found in marmoset monkey’s brain, suggesting a shared 
evolutionary origin (Buckner and Margulies 2019). Second, Vidaurre et al. investigated how 
resting-state activity unfolds in time and uncovered a systematic temporal structure that could 
be delineated as switching between two states – the propagation of neural activity tends to cycle 
within either the ‘outwardly-leaning’ sensorimotor network or the ‘inwardly-leaning’ default 
network, with sporadic transition between the two major networks (Vidaurre et al. 2017). Third, 
Dixon et al. showed that the frontoparietal control network fractionates into two major 
subsystems with each involved in different types of executive control – one is more closely 
aligned with sensorimotor regions and more active when attending external stimuli whereas 
the other is more coupled with the DN and more active when attending to internal thoughts 
(Dixon et al. 2018). In light of these recent discoveries, we asked a critical question – while 
the DN, as a whole, is more active for introspective processes, it remains unknown whether 
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there exists a similar bipartite split within the DN, with one subsystem favouring more 
externally-oriented thoughts/contexts (e.g., empathising with other people) while the other 
preferring more internally-oriented thoughts/contexts (e.g., contemplating about self). 
  
The research literature of semantic cognition offers important clues as to how the DN might 
fractionate into subsystems. Semantic cognition refers to the high-order human capacity to 
comprehend the meaning of inputs (e.g., to understand text/speech, to recognise a corkscrew 
and its function) and to produce behavioural outputs according to meaning (e.g., correctly using 
a corkscrew to open a bottle by twisting it) (Lambon Ralph et al. 2017). It is a critical cognitive 
faculty that interfaces internal representations of meaning (all our pan-modality knowledge 
about the world) with external modalities (all the incoming auditory, visual, tactile signals that 
need to be mapped onto generalisable, modality-invariant concepts). Decades of research have 
shown that the two major aspects of semantic cognition – the ability to represent contents of 
semantic knowledge and the ability to manoeuvre semantic contents in appropriate ways – rely 
on different nodes of the frontotemporal semantic network (SN). Semantic knowledge per se 
is encoded primarily by the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and various auxiliary regions (Chiou 
and Lambon Ralph 2019), whereas the ability to flexibly select and recombine semantic 
knowledge relies jointly on the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and posterior middle-temporal 
gyrus (pMTG) (for reviews, see Jefferies 2013; Lambon Ralph 2014; Lambon Ralph et al. 
2017). Intriguingly, previous research on default-mode processes often incorporates these SN 
regions – the ATL, IFG, and pMTG – as extended prongs of the DN, as compared to the three 
core regions of the DN – the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
and angular gyrus (AG) (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010; Bzdok et al. 2013; Spreng et al. 
2013). Incorporating the SN into the DN is due to their commonality: just as the core DN nodes, 
the key SN nodes are situated within the cortical realm that is deactivated by externally-directed 
non-semantic tasks (particularly the ATL, see Visser et al. 2010). Moreover, the SN regions 
have been found to link robustly with a broad swathe of the DN during both task- and resting-
state (Bzdok et al. 2013; Jackson et al. 2016; Humphreys and Lambon Ralph 2017). There are, 
however, differences – it has been shown that while the ATL and AG are both deactivated by 
externally-directed visuospatial tasks, they show opposite patterns for semantic processes, with 
ATL activity elevating while AG activity lowering for semantic tasks (Humphreys et al. 2015). 
Taken together, these commonalities and differences motivate our focus on exploring the 
relationship between the DN and SN, with the aim to understand the division within the broad 




In the present study, we report findings of two fMRI experiments whereby we systemically 
manipulated two critical neurocognitive dimensions that regulate the DN’s activity: First, 
participants were either constrained by specified correspondences among external stimuli, 
semantic meaning, and reaction within a short time-frame (Experiment 1) or were allowed to 
let internal theme-guided thoughts roam with little time pressure (Experiment 2); the former 
context demands attention to the external entities (visual stimuli and effector reaction), whereas 
the latter emphasises attention to internal thoughts. Second, cognitive operations were directed 
towards visuospatial processing of external meaningless stimuli (mental rotation or visual 
search), internal thoughts about self (reflecting on self-traits, or autobiographical memory), 
internal thoughts about others (reflecting on others-traits, or mentalisation), as well as task-free 
mind-wandering (rest). To pre-empt the main findings, with these systematic manipulations, 
we found a clear bipartite split within the DN. While the broad DN, as a whole, strongly prefers 
introspective activity to perception and action, it fractionates functionally into two bodies – 
one system favours self-referential thoughts, and its activity dwindles when thoughts pertain to 
external events. By contrast, the other system favours others-referential thoughts, and it activity 
intensifies when thoughts pertain to external events. Moreover, neural dynamics within and 
between the two subsystems alter according to whether the task-contexts accentuates external 
stimuli or internal thoughts, providing further support to the bipartite structure. These findings 
are discussed with reference to recent proposals about the macro-scale transition from 
unimodal/sensorimotor to transmodal/abstract zones that spans across the human cerebrum. 
 
Methods 
Participants. Twenty-four volunteers gave informed consent before their participation. The 
sample consisted of an 18/6 female-to-male ratio, with average age = 25 years old and SD = 7. 
All volunteers are right-handed and speak English as their mother tongue. All of them 
completed the magnetic resonance imaging safety screening questionnaire before the 
experiment, and reported not having any neurological or psychiatric condition. This study was 
reviewed and approved by the local research ethics committee. 
 
Design. Participants completed two experiments in a single session. In Experiment 1, we 
modified a well-established experimental paradigm that has been widely used to probe the 
neural basis of self-knowledge (e.g., Kelley et al. 2002; Krienen et al. 2010; Meyer and 
Lieberman 2018). Participants were asked to complete various tasks under a typical 
psychophysical context in which they were required to make a trial-by-trial response as quickly 
as possible within a brief timeframe. There were four conditions: (i) The Self-Referential Task: 
Participants read adjectives describing various personality traits and assessed whether the 
words suitably describe the characteristics of themselves; (ii) The Other-Referential Task: 
Similar to the Self task, participants read adjectives and assessed whether the depictions suit 
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the Queen Elizabeth II’s personality; (iii) The Visuospatial Task: Participants viewed a pair of 
meaningless scrambled visual patterns and answered whether the two were mirror inverse of 
each other; (iv) Mind-Wandering (Rest): Participants passively viewed a blank screen while 
awaiting the next task block to begin.  
 
Experiment 1 consisted of three runs of scanning. Stimuli were presented using a block design, 
controlled with E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools). Each run was 432-sec in duration, with 
each of the four conditions (Self/Other/Visuospatial/Rest) having six blocks. The order in 
which task-conditions were presented was fully counterbalanced across participants so that 
each task-condition was equally likely to appear in every possible slot of the sequences, with 
stimuli randomly drawn from a designated stimuli-set (also counterbalanced across participants) 
for a given scan and shuffled across blocks. Each block contained five trials. Each trial began 
with a fixation dot (0.8 sec), followed by visual stimuli shown for 2.8 sec and no inter-trial 
interval. In the Self and Other conditions (see the Supplemental Figure S1 for task procedure), 
we displayed the target of assessment (Self or Queen) above the fixation dot and asked 
participants to answer whether an adjective word (below the central dot) suitably described the 
personality of the target individual. In the Visuospatial condition, we displayed two scrambled 
visual patterns (squiggly lines made from randomly breaking and recombining word text of 
other two conditions); participants performed mental rotation and answered whether the two 
patterns were left-right flipped. Participants were required to react as fast (and accurately for 
the Visuospatial Task) as possible within the 2.8-sec limit. In the Rest periods, we displayed a 
blank screen and instructed participants to stay awake and still while awaiting the next task. 
Participants reacted to the questions by pressing a button on a MR-compatible response pad 
with their right hand. All visual stimuli were displayed on a mid-grey background, using a 
high-resolution LCD goggles (NordicNeuroLab) mounted on top of the head coil. 
 
A total of 180 adjectives were used in the Self and Other conditions, with 90 words used in 
each condition. The mapping with which a word was shown in either the Self or Other condition 
was fully counterbalanced across the participants so that each adjective was equally probable 
to be assessed with reference with self or the Queen. The stimuli-sets contained equal 
proportion of positive traits and negative traits, evenly allocated to the two conditions. 
Moreover, we controlled the lexical frequency (based on the British National Corpus) and word 
length (based on the number of letters; average±SD: 8±2 letters in both conditions) of the 
stimuli so that the stimuli-sets used in the two task conditions was matched on these 
psycholinguistic properties. 
 
Experiment 2 consisted of four runs of scanning. We adopted and modified an established 
experimental design of a landmark study that has been widely used to probe functions of the 
default network (Spreng and Grady 2010). Stimuli were presented using a slow event-related 
design. Each run was 432-sec in duration. There were four conditions – Autobiographical 
Memory (AM), Theory of Mind (ToM), Visuospatial Search (VS), and Rest. Each run 
consisted of 18 active-task events (AM, ToM, VS; six events per condition per run, giving 24 
events per condition for the whole experiment) and 18 randomly-jittered Rest intervals 
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intervening between active-task events (duration of jittered Rest – average±SD = 6±2.74 sec, 
range: 2 – 12.5 sec). The order in which task-conditions were presented was fully 
counterbalanced across participants so that the events of each task-condition were equally 
likely to appear in every possible position of the sequences, with stimuli randomly drawn from 
a designated stimuli-set (also counterbalanced, hence each set being equiprobable to be used 
in Run 1–4). In the AM task, participants were required to recollect personal experiences 
(including their own thoughts and feelings at the time, as well as the temporal-spatial contexts) 
related to the theme of a photograph depicting human activity (see below for details). In the 
ToM task, participants were required to imagine how the individual(s) in the photograph might 
be thinking or feeling. In the VS task, participants viewed mosaic scrambled patterns and 
search for a tiny grey triangle hidden in the patterns. 
 
Each trial began with a cue word for 1 sec, prompting participants the upcoming task (AM: 
Remember, ToM: Imagine, VS: Search). This was followed by a centrally presented image 
(600 × 380 pixels), as well as a short passage below the image, displayed for 15 sec. In the AM 
and ToM conditions, the images were photographs depicting people in various situations of life 
(e.g., seeing a dentist, cooking in the kitchen, protesting in a rally, etc.). The short text below 
was 20 words in length, serving as a cue to help participants with autobiographical recollection 
or imagining about others’ thoughts and feelings (e.g., AM: “Remember the time you learnt the 
outcome of Brexit referendum. How did you feel? How did you respond to it?” or ToM: 
“Imagine what the girl who’s holding the Christmas cracker is thinking and feeling. Also 
imagine how her grandpa would respond”). In the VS condition, the images were made from 
scrambling images of other conditions into random mosaic patterns, and the text below simply 
said “Is there a tiny triangle hidden in the pattern?” The triangle was present in a half of the 
trials. After the 15-sec interval during which participants recollected, imagined, or searched, a 
question was shown for 2 sec asking participants to rate how vivid their memory or imagery 
was (1: Very vivid, 2: Somewhat vivid, 3: Not at all vivid) by pressing a designated button on 
the response pad. In the VS condition, the question asked if there was a triangle in the pattern, 
and participants answered with a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ key response. Participants were instructed 
to concentrate on the recollection, imagery, and visual-search during the 15-sec interval, and 
they should make a response only when the question was shown at the end. 
 
Prior to scanning, we used a similar 3-step training protocol to that of the Spreng and Grady 
study (Spreng and Grady 2010) to ensure that all of the participants were able to engage 
confidently in retrieving autobiographical events related to the picture’s topic and imagining 
the thoughts and feelings that people in the picture might have. Forty-eight photographs 
depicting human activities and interactions, all of them containing at least one person or more, 
were used in the AM and ToM conditions, with a half of them used in one condition and the 
remaining half used in the other. We fully counterbalanced the images and conditions across 
participants to ensure that: (i) each photograph was equally likely to be presented as a cue in 
the AM and ToM condition, ruling out stimuli-specific effects; (ii) for each participant, separate 
sets of photographs were used as cues for the AM and ToM contexts, thus preventing 




Scanning. Full details of data-acquisition parameters, procedures of pre-processing, and 
statistical analysis are reported in Supplemental Information (SI). Here we provide the key 
information: The brain regions of our primary interest are situated in the rostro-ventral aspects 
of the brain (e.g., the ATL, the vmPFC), which are known to particularly susceptible to signal 
dropout (Halai et al. 2014). To combat the dropout issue in these target areas, we adopted a 
dual-echo EPI sequence, which has been demonstrated to improve signal-to-nose ratio around 
these rostro-ventral regions relative to other conventional imaging protocols (e.g., Halai et al. 
2014; Humphreys et al. 2015; Chiou et al. 2018). A customised procedure was used to combine 
the two echo-time images of each brain volume. Using SPM8, we integrated the standard pre-
processing procedures with multiple correction methods to prevent image distortion and 
improve inter-participant alignment for group analysis. For statistical analysis at the individual 
level, all of experimental conditions of each experiment were modelled explicitly as separate 
regressors, while mind-wandering periods (rest) were modelled implicitly, as per the default of 
SPM. Blocks/events corresponding to our experimental factors were convolved with a 
canonical haemodynamic response function. Response-execution periods in Experiment 2 were 
modelled as a separate regressor. Six motion parameters were entered into the model as 
covariates of no-interest. Behavioural reaction times were also modelled as parametric 
modulators to rule out the confounding influences due to task difficulty or cognitive effort. 
 
Regions of interest (ROIs). In SI, we report the full details of the 10 ROI-coordinates in the 
MNI stereotaxic space and pinpoint the sites on the template images. All of these ROIs are 
selected independent of the task-contrasts of the two experiments, based on the meta-analysis 
outcomes of relevant literatures. Specifically, we surveyed four relevant studies of 
neuroimaging meta-analyses (Bzdok et al. 2012; Noonan et al. 2013; Humphreys and Lambon 
Ralph 2014; Rice et al. 2015) about the neural correlates of default-mode functions (the targets 
include brain area robustly related to mind-wandering, daydreaming, self-representation, 
autobiographical memory, theory of mind, episodic memory), semantic cognition (including 
semantic memory, semantic control, conceptual knowledge), and social cognition (including 
theory of mind, mentalising, empathy). Using the activation likelihood estimates (ALE) 
identified by these topic-focused meta-analyses, we identified 10 important nodes closely 
associated with different aspects of default-mode and semantic-related functions – the dmPFC, 
vmPFC, PCC, bilateral AG, bilateral TPJ, left ATL, left IFG, left pMTG. At each of the ALE 
peak-coordinates, we created a spherical ROI with 6-mm radius. Next, we evaluated the 
suitability of the selected ROIs by using the ‘association-test’ function of NeuroSynth (a large-
scale fMRI meta-analysis platform; Yarkoni et al. 2011). Based on the results of terms-based 
search (default-mode, semantic memory, theory of mind, mentalising) that contain 2,214 studies 
and 84,573 peaks, NeuroSynth generated the ‘association-test’ maps that represent brain areas 
statistically significantly (FDR-corrected at q < 0.01) associated with these functions. We then 
compared our selected ROIs and these maps, and confirmed that all of the 10 chosen ROIs are 




Dynamic causal modelling (DCM). We performed a series of six DCM analyses using DCM10 
in SPM8 (Friston et al. 2003). DCM-1, DCM-3, and DCM-5 were performed on the data of 
Experiment 1, whereas DCM-2, DCM-4, and DCM-6 were done on the data of Experiment 2. For 
each DCM, we localised the network nodes based on the same coordinates that we defined using 
relevant literatures, verified using NeuroSynth, and confirmed their involvement in the tasks using 
a series of ROI analysis. Each network node was localised using a spherical ROI with 6-mm radius 
centred at the designated coordinate. Activated voxels within each node were identified using the 
relevant contrasts (i.e., Experiment 1: Self+Other > Rest; Experiment 2: AM+ToM > Rest) 
thresholded at p < 0.001 for voxel intensity. We used the SPM’s default algorithms to extract the 
first eigenvariate to obtain the time-series of activity, as per the standard procedure of DCM. This 
process was repeated for all of the selected regions in each participant. All of the DCM were set to 
have one state per region and without stochastic modulatory effect. Based on the extracted activity, 
we constructed and estimated DCM separately for each participant, and then employed the 
Variational Bayesian Analysis (VBA) Toolbox (Daunizeau et al. 2014; Rigoux et al. 2014) to 
conduct random-effects (RFX) group analyses using its functions of Bayesian models selection. 
The RFX procedure outputted the protected exceedance probability (PEP; Rigoux et al. 2014), 
which is a unbiased probabilistic estimate that quantifies how likely that, for an individual 
randomly drawn from the population, the model being considered provides the best fit to this 
person’s fMRI data than any other provided model, above and beyond the chance-level. The 
chance-level represents the probability of all models being equally likely (1/K, with K being the 
number of models; we had 0.33 as the chance-level for all analyses). Bayesian model selection does 
not rely on a binary, arbitrary cut-off threshold. Rather, it relies on identifying the model that shows 
the highest, sufficiently above-chance PEP.    
 
Here we specify the model spaces: (i) In DCM-1 and DCM-2, we focused on the relationship 
between the dmPFC and the vmPFC; for each DCM, we constructed three models, and each model 
contained two nodes, with the input signal entering via the dmPFC, the vmPFC, or both nodes. The 
two nodes were set to be mutually connected. (ii) In DCM-3 and DCM-4, we focused on the 
relationship amongst the IFG, the ATL, and the vmPFC; for each DCM, we constructed three 
models, and each model contained three nodes, with the input signal entering via the IFG, the ATL, 
or the vmPFC. All of the three nodes were set to be mutually connected. (iii) In DCM-5, we focused 
on the relationship between nodes within the SN (the IFG, the pMTG, the dmPFC, and the ATL) 
and tested only using Experiment 1’s data. We constructed three models, and each model contained 
four nodes, with the input signal entering via the IFG, the pMTG, or the dmPFC. Here we did not 
include the ATL as an entry node because the outcome of the preceding DCM-3 had already 
indicated that the probability of ATL-input model being the winner was close to zero. In order to 
constrain the size of model space to having three models and maintain a consistent chance-level 
across analyses, we included only the IFG-, pMTG-, and dmPFC-input models. The four nodes 
were set to be mutually connected. (iv) In DCM-6, we focused on the relationship between nodes 
within the core DN (the PCC, the AG, the vmPFC) and tested only using Experiment 2’s data; we 
constructed three models, and each model contained three nodes, with the input signal entering via 





Experiment 1 created a restrictive and relatively outwardly-directed context – participants read 
text about personality traits, assessed its pertinence with regard to either self or another 
individual, and reacted with a button-press within a short timeframe using specified rules about 
the mapping between meanings and fingers. By contrast, Experiment 2 created a less restrictive 
and inwardly-directed context – prompted by a photograph and its theme, participants either 
recalled autobiographical memory (AM) related to the theme or imagined how the people in 
the picture might be thinking or feeling (theory of mind/ToM). No restriction on thinking, no 
requirement for explicit reaction, and little time pressure were imposed while participants 
engaged in AM and ToM, allowing immersion in introspective activates. This contrastive task-
settings allowed investigations into whether the brain responds differentially to internally- vs. 
externally-directed situations. Analysis of behaviour data showed that conditions designed to 
probe the functions of DN and SN are matched on their psychophysical profiles (see SI). 
Analyses of fMRI data were performed at multiple scales: We first interrogated the entire brain 
to examine whether different brain structures exhibit preferences for different contexts. We 
subsequently zoomed in on the regions of interest (ROIs) within the DN and SN, comparing 
the two networks’ preferential reactions to different task-settings. In addition to the direct 
contrast between DN and SN nodes, we focused specifically on the functional subdivision at a 
provincial-scale, inspecting the responses of adjacent areas within the mPFC and within the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL). This local-scale inspection was motivated by recent mounting 
evidence that (i) the broad mPFC zone harbours two sub-sections, with its dorsomedial part 
(the dmPFC) being more connected with the SN and its ventromedial part (the vmPFC) being 
more connected with the DN (Bzdok et al. 2013), and that (ii) a similar bisection has also been 
observed in the IPL, with its anterior section (the temporoparietal junction/TPJ) being more 
connected with the SN and posterior section (the AG) more connected with other DN nodes 
(Uddin et al. 2010; Mars et al. 2011; Braga et al. 2019). 
 
Resting-state/task-negative activity reveals a bipartite split between the DN & SN. The traditional 
definition of the default system is a set of brain regions whose activity drops when the mind is 
engaged by goal-driven behaviour yet rises when the mind is idle during wakeful resting-state. 
While the DN and SN both fall within the realm of this purported ‘task-negative’ zone, it 
remains unclear whether they respond differentially to resting-state wherein the mind is free 
from the preoccupation of explicit goals and salient stimuli. To this end, we included, in both 
experiments, visuospatial control tasks that are design to elicit deactivation of the classic ‘task-
12 
 
negative’ zones – in Experiment 1, participants mentally rotated squiggly stimuli and compared 
their visual configurations, while in Experiment 2 they searched for a tiny triangle hidden in 
mosaic patterns. We began by a whole-brain interrogation to identify regions that are 
significantly more active during rest, compared to the visuospatial conditions, stringently 
thresholded using FWE-correction (p < 0.05) for whole-brain voxel-wise intensity. Results 
corroborate the classic definition of the ‘task-negative’ neuroanatomy: As shown in Fig. 1A, 
resting-state activity is amplified in extensive swathes of the DN and the SN, relative to the 
visuospatial tasks of mental rotation and visual search. As illustrated by the conjunctive clusters 
of Fig. 1A, the peak-points of resting-state activation concur between the two experiments at 
the key nodes of DN (the mPFC, PCC, and left AG), as well as the key nodes of SN (the 
bilateral ATL, left IFG, and bilateral pMTG). Importantly, the two networks differ in their 
magnitude of resting-state activation. As revealed by the ROI analysis, compared to SN regions, 
brain regions conventionally classified as core constituents of the DN exhibit reliably greater 
responses to resting-state (i.e., greater extent of deactivation for the visuospatial tasks). This is 
observed both at the regional and multi-node network levels: At a local level (within the mPFC), 
resting-state triggers significantly greater activity of the vmPFC (a sub-region more closely 
linked with other DN regions) compared to the dmPFC (a sub-region more closely linked with 
the SN), resulting in reliable effects seen in both experiments (F(1,23) = 13.16, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 
0.36; see Fig. 1B). At a network level (the broad ‘task-negative’ zones), the three ROIs known 
to form the core DN (the vmPFC, PCC, and AG; see Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010) show 
significantly greater activity during resting-state, relative to the three ROIs known to form the 
core SN (the ATL, IFG, and pMTG; see Lambon Ralph et al. 2017), also reliably found in both 
experiments (F(1,23) = 56.20, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.71; see Fig. 1C). Taken together, despite the fact 
that the DN and SN show common tendencies (i.e., activity heightens during rest and lessens 
during visuospatial tasks), activity of DN regions during rest is significantly more intensive, 
dwarfing the comparatively moderate response of SN regions. Moreover, our results indicate 
that while the wide mPFC is sometimes conflated as a unitary, monolithic region, it is actually 
heterogeneous, with its ventral section leaning towards the DN and responding vigorously 
during resting-state and its dorsal section leaning towards the SN and responding moderately. 
 
A close inspection on the results of whole-brain analysis (Fig. 1A) revealed some discrepancy 
between the resting-state activities of Experiment 1 and 2 alongside their commonality. While 
resting-state activity of Experiment 1 and 2 occupied the typical neural estates of DN and SN 
with considerable overlaps (the cyan clusters, Fig. 1A), the resting periods of each experiment 
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elicited specific regions that were less involved during the resting time of the other experiment 
(the green and blue clusters, Fig. 1A). The resting times of Experiment 1 preferentially engaged 
the dorsal section of the PCC and the TPJ, while those of Experiment 2 preferentially engaged 
the medial temporal lobe/MTL (the parahippocampal cortex/PHC, and the entorhinal/perirhinal 
cortices). Intriguingly, this finding fits with the separation of ‘Network-A’ and ‘Network-B’ 
discovered in recent resting-state studies (cf. the original nomenclature; Braga and Buckner 
2017; Braga et al. 2019) – while Network-A and -B are closely juxtaposed, they dissociate on 
several ‘diagnostic’ areas, with Network-A preferentially including the PHC and Network-B 
preferentially encompassing the dorsal PCC and TPJ. A potential contributing factor to the 
pattern that we found might be differences in task-settings that biased subsequent resting-state 
activity. While the resting intervals in both experiments were yoked in terms of psychophysical 
settings (i.e., participants passively viewed a fixation cross without performing any task), the 
two experiments differed in the task-contexts that preceded a resting period. Specifically, 
Experiment 1 demanded trial-by-trial semantic judgement on personality traits, whereas 
Experiment 2 provided a response-free context allowing detailed mnemonic retrieval to unfold. 
There has been reliable evidence showing that task-settings can modulate subsequent resting-
state activation and connectivity (e.g., performing personality judgment selectively enhances 
subsequent connectivity of DN/SN regions during rest; see Meyer et al. 2019). This hints that 
an episode of goal-directed mental activity might shape subsequent network architecture during 
rest, be the taxonomy of networks being ‘Network-A vs. Network-B’ or ‘DN vs. SN’. Future 
research is needed to ascertain the cause and effect (e.g., autobiographical memory might have 
lingering effects that preferentially boost the resting-state activity of PHC/MTL/Network-A, 
whereas socio-semantic judgments might preferentially boost the TPJ/Network-B). Additional 
information about the comparison between resting-state and control-tasks across experiments 
is reported in SI (see the Supplemental Figure S2). 
 
Different types of self-referential mental activities reveal a bipartite split between the DN & SN. 
Mental activities related to ‘self’ are intuitively ‘inwardly-leaning’ and have been known to be 
strongly associated with the DN (for review, see Qin and Northoff 2011; Molnar-Szakacs and 
Uddin 2013). In particular, much emphasis has been laid on the mPFC – various types of self-
related mental activities robustly engage this area, and pathology of the mPFC leads to 
difficulty in self-regulation (for review, see Wagner et al. 2012). Previous neuroimaging 
investigation into the neural basis of self-related processes have adopted two primary types of 
experimental approaches: One pervasive approach is asking participants to access self-concept 
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via evaluating adjectives about personality traits with reference to self, which entails 
participants processing semantic information, bearing the task rules in mind, and reacting on a 
trial-by-trial basis within a time limit (e.g., Kelley et al. 2002; Meyer and Lieberman 2018; 
Murphy, Poerio, et al. 2019). The other popular approach is asking participants to recollect 
autobiographical memories related to a provided topic while participants have sufficient time 
(typically an interval longer than 10s) to engage in mnemonic retrieval (e.g., Spreng and Grady 
2010). The former approach is more ‘semantic’ in nature and entails an outwardly-focused 
context (reading text, pushing buttons), whereas the latter is more ‘episodic’ in nature and 
entails an inwardly-focused context. Our experiments provided us a unique window into how 
the DN and SN might respond differently to self-related activities under these two types of 
situations. We began unpicking this difference by examining the whole-brain activity pattern, 
comparing the distribution of activities induced by the self-traits assessment task (‘semantic-
self’) and the autobiographical recollection task (‘episodic-self’). As illustrated in Figure 2A, 
both tasks significantly increase activities of various DN and SN regions compared to rest, 
replicating previous data that goal-directed introspective activities heighten the DN compared 
to the resting-state wherein aimless mind-wandering often happens (Spreng and Grady 2010). 
However, closer inspection on the pattern reveals that while expansive swathes of the SN 
regions are recruited by both tasks, the three core DN nodes (the vmPFC, PCC, and AG) are 
exclusively recruited only when one processes ‘episodic-self’ during the autobiographical task. 
Such differential engagement of the DN and SN by the two types of self-related processing 
becomes clearly manifested when we examine the ROIs (note that all of the contrast baseline 
here is resting-state, rather than external-visuospatial tasks, hence allowing us to assess whether 
goal-directed introspective activity further enhances neural reaction on top of resting-state 
activity, without the contamination from suppressive effects of external tasks): As Figure 2B 
shows, within the mPFC, its ‘SN-leaning’ dorsal section is more active for self-concept, 
whereas its ‘DN-leaning’ ventral section is more active for autobiographical memory, resulting 
in a significant interaction (F(1,23) = 29.37, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.56). This dissociation is not only 
found at the local scale within the mPFC, but also seen at a more global scale: As Figure 2C 
illustrates, while nearly all of the ROIs exhibits preference for autobiographical memory over 
self-concept, this preference is evidently much attenuated in the three ROIs belong to the SN, 
particularly in the inferior frontal gyrus (F(1,23) = 19.72, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.46). To dissect this 
network-by-task interaction further, we separately scrutinised the neural response to each task 
and found that retrieval of autobiographical memory engages regions of the DN and SN to an 
equivalent extent (p > 0.32, Fig. 2D right). By stark contrast, accessing self-concept primarily 
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recruits the SN yet minimally engages the DN, leading to a significant difference (p < 0.001, 
Fig. 2D left). Finally, we plotted the magnitude of preference for autobiographical memory 
over self-concept (indexed as their β-weight difference) for each ROI to manifest their 
relationship: As Fig. 2E shows, while all of the ROIs are more active for autobiographical 
recollection, there is a clear split, with all of the DN nodes exhibiting strong preference above 
the average and median level (driven primarily by their disengagement during the self-concept 
task) and all of the SN nodes showing much mitigated preference falling below the average and 
median (indicating the SN’s all-embracing participation in both tasks). These results clearly 
indicate a bipartite split in the neurocognitive substrates for different types of self-related 
processing – accessing self-related semantic knowledge relies on the SN while barely involves 
the DN, whereas accessing episodic memory of life-events is a multifaceted process that fuses 
temporospatial details with semantic meaning and is supported by both the DN and SN. 
 
The choice of baseline affects whether mPFC activation appears in the contrast of task situations. 
Our results show that the dmPFC (also the vmPFC, albeit to a less extent) augments its activity 
when participants evaluate personality descriptions with reference to self, replicating previous 
findings (e.g., Kelley et al. 2002; Macrae et al. 2004; Heatherton et al. 2006). However, a 
closer inspection of previous studies reveals that this is actually driven by less deactivation for 
the ‘Self > Rest’ contrast (which often results in no difference), compared to other contrasts 
that induce more deactivation due to greater mPFC activity during rest (e.g., ‘Other > Rest’ or 
‘Letter-case > Rest’). In light of such observations, we further inspected the data of Experiment 
1 by comparing the Self condition with three different baselines (Other, Visuospatial, and Rest). 
All of the analyses were conducted using whole-brain interrogation, thresholded at P < 0.05 
with FWE-corrected for voxel-wise intensity. As illustrated in Fig. 3, the vmPFC responds to 
the Self-concept task and rest-state with comparable activation level, resulting in no significant 
cluster in the vmPFC region in both contrasts (‘Self > Rest’ & ‘Rest > Self’; Fig. 3 right). This 
is consistent with previous findings that participants tend to think about themselves during the 
resting period (Meyer and Lieberman 2018), driving vmPFC activity to persist despite no task 
during rest. However, a significantly active vmPFC-cluster emerges when we searched for ‘Self 
> Other’ and ‘Rest > Other’ (Fig. 3 middle, although the cluster size of ‘Rest > Other’ is 
understandably smaller). The size of this cluster further expands when we searched for ‘Self > 
Visuospatial’ and ‘Rest > Visuospatial’ (Fig. 3 left). This suggests a graded participation – the 
vmPFC is least involved during the visuospatial task, most involved during the Self-concept 
task; situated in between are the contexts of resting-state and the Other-concept task. These 
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results supplement what we report in the section above – when the reference of contrast is a 
passive rest-interval, the autobiographical task (active, goal-directed processes while allowing 
immersion into self-generated thoughts) boosts vmPFC activity beyond its level during resting-
state, whereas the Self-concept assessment task (which requires attention to stimuli and output-
effector) induces vmPFC activity that is just commensurate with its resting-state level. 
 
Self- vs. other-referential mental activities reveal a bipartite split between the DN & SN.  
Decades of research has accumulated a myriad of evidence for shared neural substrates for 
understanding the mental states of both self and others (van der Meer et al. 2010; Molenberghs 
et al. 2016; Heleven and Van Overwalle 2018). This shared neurocognitive system for both 
self- and other-referential processing comprises the cortical midline-structures (i.e., the dmPFC, 
vmPFC, and PCC) and some lateral regions (including the ATL, IFG, pMTG, and IPL). 
However, it remains unclear whether the constituent regions in this system split into 
subsystems depending on whether they prefer inwardly- (e.g., reflecting on self) vs. outwardly-
directed (e.g., mentalising about others) processes. Experiment 2 provided conducive 
circumstances to study whether there is a schism due to preferred processes – during the AM 
situation, participants recollected their own memories/feelings about specific episodes of life, 
whereas during the ToM situation, they made inferences about the mental states of other people. 
While the two tasks differed on the focus of social target (inward/self vs. outward/others), they 
were yoked and matched by our experimental design: Identical, counterbalanced stimuli were 
used in both conditions to rule out stimuli-related effects, and no external response was required 
during the AM and ToM periods to encourage them to concentrate on introspective experiences 
during the lengthy interval. Results of the whole-brain search, based on the direct contrast 
between the AM and ToM contexts, reveal a bipartite split that corroborates our speculation: 
As shown in Fig. 4A, all of the three core DN regions (the vmPFC, PCC, and AG) were 
preferentially more engaged by AM compared to ToM. By contrast, extensive stretches of the 
SN regions (including the three core SN nodes – the bilateral IFG, ATL, and pMTG, as well 
as regions related to ToM, such as the temporoparietal junction/TPJ) were more engaged by 
ToM than AM. Analysis of ROIs further highlights the granularity of such bipartite structure 
(like our previous analysis, all of the ROI analysis here is based on β-weight compared against 
rest, allowing us to gauge whether task-driven activity surpasses the baseline): As shown in 
Fig. 4B, an evident split is found within the mPFC, with its ‘SN-leaning’ dorsal section 
preferring other-referential/ToM processes and its ‘DN-leaning’ ventral section preferring self-
referential/AM processes (F(1,23) = 15.87, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.41). The split is also observed at 
17 
 
the network level (Fig. 4C), with the core DN midline-structures (i.e., the vmPFC and PCC) 
exhibiting a strong preference for self- over other-referential processes and all of the three SN 
nodes (the IFG, ATL, pMTG) exhibiting a marked preference for other over self (F(1,23) = 42.43, 
p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.65). Note that all of these DN and SN regions are significantly above the 
resting baseline. This underscores the fact that, despite different regions showing preferential 
reaction to AM or ToM, activities of both networks ramp up during both introspective tasks. 
Next, we focused on the IPL – this analysis is motivated by two threads of evidence: (i) the 
anterior IPL sector (i.e., the TPJ) is more closely linked with the ‘SN-leaning’ dmPFC whereas 
the posterior sector (the AG) is more linked with the ‘DN-leaning’ vmPFC (Bzdok et al. 2013; 
Braga et al. 2019); (ii) the bilateral TPJ has been shown to be involved in simulating the mental 
states of other people, with the right TPJ tending to show more pronounced responses than its 
left counterpart (e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Saxe and Wexler 2005). We selectively 
examined the response profiles of the bilateral AG and TPJ, and the results are shown in Fig. 
4D: Although the AG and TPJ are adjacent to each other, they prefer different types of 
introspective activities (F(1,23) = 93.34, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.80): The bilateral AG show an overall 
preference for the self-referential AM condition over the other-referential ToM condition (p = 
0.007, although the preference is more exaggerated in the right AG). By contrast, the TPJ show 
an overall preference for ToM over AM, reliably seen in both hemispheres (p < 0.001). Finally, 
we focused on a set of regions displaying a preference for other-referential processing – the 
dmPFC and the bilateral TPJ (Fig. 4E). We specifically examined whether their response 
profiles alter with different types of other-referential processing: assessing the personality traits 
of another person (Experiment 1) vs. simulating what someone might be thinking (Experiment 
2). A significant interaction statistically supports their distinct characteristics (F(1,23) = 7.75, p 
= 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.25): While the response amplitude of the dmPFC does not differ between the 
personality knowledge and ToM contexts (p = 0.27), the left TPJ (p = 0.002) and right TPJ (p 
< 0.001) both reveal a robustly greater response to ToM compared to personality knowledge. 
Also see the Supplemental Figure S3 and S4 for (i) discussion about the involvement of various 
semantic-related regions in the personality-trait task, regardless of whether the target under 
evaluation is self or other; (ii) additional analysis on three middle temporal lobe (MTL) regions. 
 
Taken together, these results depict a coherent pattern that complements our earlier findings – 
albeit somewhat oversimplified, an ‘inward vs. outward’ principle captures crucial aspects of 
the functional profile of the broad default system. Whereas DN regions prefer introspective 
activities that are disjoined from external events, self-referential, and episode-based 
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(remembering), SN regions prefer activities that are other-referential and fact-based (knowing). 
Furthermore, our data corroborate a division of labour that has been documented previously 
(Wagner et al. 2012; Wagner et al. 2016; Heleven and Van Overwalle 2018) – within the 
subsystem that prefers other-referential processing, the dmPFC is recruited whenever a task 
involves ascribing socio-emotive features to a person, be it self or other, whereas the TPJ is 
preferentially recruited for ‘online’ stimulation of mental states during the ToM-type of tasks. 
 
Externally- and internally-oriented task-focuses modulate the neural dynamics of the DN & SN. 
We capitalised on dynamic causal modelling (DCM; Friston et al. 2003; Friston et al. 2017) to 
investigate whether and how the causative/directional neural dynamics within and between the 
DN and SN alter as a result of switching between externally- and internally-directed task-focus. 
Decades of validations based on empirical fMRI data have substantiated the efficacy of DCM 
in making inferences about the causative connectivity between brain regions, outperforming 
other analytical approaches of causative connectivity (for review, see Friston et al. 2013). 
Particularly, DCM enables researchers to apply a Bayesian statistical procedure to compare 
and select, amongst multiple candidate models, the ‘winner’ model that offers the most 
probable explanation regarding the mechanistic neural implementation that generates the 
observed fMRI data (Stephan et al. 2009; Rigoux et al. 2014). This statistical procedure 
estimates the ‘protected exceedance probability’ (Rigoux et al. 2014), indicating whether a 
model’s explanatory power surpasses any other candidate (as compared to the remaining 
models) above and beyond the likelihood of all models being equiprobable (as compared to 
chance). Here we report a series of DCM analyses, investigating whether the directionality of 
communication between/within the DN and SN changes depending on whether the task 
encourages mental activities that are more externally-oriented (Experiment 1: the personality-
trait tasks that confine thoughts, require explicit motoric response, and stipulate stimulus-
response mappings) vs. internally-oriented (Experiment 2: the AM and ToM tasks that allow 
unrestrained thoughts and do not entail any overt response). As discussed below (also see 
Methods), for different models we assumed that incoming signals enter the network through a 
different brain area (which belongs to either the DN or SN), which represents the ‘inception’ 
event that triggers subsequent neural dynamics. We then employed Bayesian statistical 





The first (Experiment 1; Fig. 5A) and second (Experiment 2; Fig. 5B) DCM analyses were 
focused on the mPFC. Our earlier analysis reveals a local-scale bipartite split, with the dmPFC 
favouring externally-directed tasks and the vmPFC favouring internally-directed tasks. Based 
on this, we examined whether task-contexts impact on the ‘starting-point’ from which the flow 
of neural processing cascades downstream. This was implemented by assuming, for different 
models, a different ‘entry’ location through which the triggering input enters the two-node 
network (dmPFC vs. vmPFC). For each DCM, we constructed three models, hypothesising that 
the trigger enters the system through the dmPFC, vmPFC, or both nodes (see Fig. 5A and 5B). 
Exactly identical coordinates of the dmPFC and vmPFC were applied to localise the network 
nodes for the analyses of Experiment 1 and 2. This permits a rigorous test on whether the very 
same group of brain regions adjust their interplay under externally- vs. internally-veered 
contexts, through the comparison of the two DCM outcomes. Using well-established Bayesian 
procedures (Daunizeau et al. 2014; Rigoux et al. 2014) to select the model that provides the 
best mechanistic explanation for the fMRI data, we found that task-focus drastically changes 
the directionality of neural dynamics. As clearly indicated by the magnitude of protected 
exceedance probabilities, when the task focussed on externally-directed mental activities 
(Experiment 1; Fig. 5A), the dmPFC-input model overwhelmingly outperformed other models 
and was the only model that substantially exceeded the chance level. By contrast, when the task 
encouraged internally-directed processes (Experiment 2; Fig. 5B), the vmPFC-input model 
became the winner that strikingly outperformed other models and was the only model that 
performed above chance. This demonstrates the reversal effect of task-contexts – when the task 
was directed externally, the SN-leaning dmPFC initiated the onset of neural dynamics; by 
contrast, when the task was directed internally, the DN-leaning vmPFC became the trigger. 
 
Next, in the third (Experiment 1; Fig. 6A) and fourth (Experiment 2; Fig. 6B) DCM, we focused 
on the trilateral communication among the IFG, the ATL, and the vmPFC. These rostral-
frontotemporal nodes were included in the model owing to their respective roles in controlling 
semantic retrieval (the IFG: Noonan et al. 2013; Chiou et al. 2018), representing semantic 
concepts (the ATL: Lambon Ralph et al. 2017), and underpinning internally-focused thoughts 
(the vmPFC: Spreng and Grady 2010). We constructed three models for each DCM, assumed 
a different starting-point for each model (IFG-input, ATL-input, or vmPFC-input), and set both 
DCM to be based on identical nodes. Results of Bayesian model selection are shown in Fig. 6: 
During the externally-focused Experiment 1, the IFG-input model exceedingly outperformed 
other models and was the only model that surpassed chance levels (Fig. 6A). However, during 
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the internally-focused Experiment 2 (Fig. 6B), the network changed the dynamics between 
nodes – the vmPFC-model became the one that won over other models by a massive margin, 
offering the best account for the underlying neural interactions. This yields a consistent pattern 
across analyses – under an externally-biased context, neural dynamics stemmed from an SN 
site (DCM-1, DCM-3), whereas under an internally-biased situation, neural dynamics 
commenced from a DN site (DCM-2, DCM-4). 
 
Finally, in the fifth (Experiment 1; Fig. 7A) and sixth (Experiment 2; Fig. 7B) DCM, we 
specifically focused on the SN for Experiment 1, and on the DN for Experiment 2, motivated 
by the robust contextual modulations that we observed in earlier analyses. These analyses 
aimed to identify, amongst all constituent sites within the SN/DC, the most reliable region that 
launches neural dynamics under an externally- and internally-biased context. Thus, in DCM-5, 
we included all the key nodes closely associated with the SN – the IFG, the ATL, the pMTG, 
and the dmPFC. We constructed three models, hypothesising the triggering signal might start 
from the IFG, the pMTG, or the dmPFC. Results of Bayesian model selection showed that, as 
illustrated in Fig. 7A, the IFG-input model gained the highest protected exceedance probability 
and was the only model above the chance threshold, trumping other models. By contrast, in 
DCM-6, we included all the core nodes of the DN – the vmPFC, the PCC, the AG. Three 
models were built, with the triggering signal entering via the vmPFC, the PCC, or the AG. As 
shown in Fig. 7B, results of model comparison indicated that the vmPFC-input model gained 
most Bayes posterior likelihood, greatly outperforming other hypotheses. Taken together, this 
series of DCM analyses clearly demonstrated the fluidity of context-dependent neural 
dynamics – akin to a tug-of-war occurring at the neural level, an externally-focused task propels 
information to flow from an SN origin to the DN (with the IFG being the most reliable 
triggering point), whereas an internally-focused task drives signal to travel from a DN origin 
to the SN (with the vmPFC being the most reliable triggering unit). 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, we conducted a series of analyses to investigate the fusion and fission 
between the DN and SN under various contexts. Results revealed a highly robust dissociation 
– within the distributed network that favours internally-constructed representations and tends 
to shy away from sensory-motoric processes, we found that each region’s preferential reactions 
to the subtle distinction between contexts leads to a bipartite subdivision within the network. 
One subset of regions constitute the DN – it shows a strong antipathy for externally-directed 
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visuospatial tasks, tends to withdraw from tasks that require attention to external entities (e.g., 
reading text, pushing buttons), and prefers self-referential to other-referential processing even 
when the psychophysical settings of tasks are yoked. Another subset of regions constitute the 
SN – its aversive response to visuospatial tasks is more moderate than that of the DN; it actively 
participates in various socio-semantic tasks unaffected by the need to attend external entities 
(unlike the DN that shows minimal involvement under such circumstances), and it prefers 
other-referential to self-referential processing. Furthermore, a task-context that encourages 
participants to focus inwardly drives neural dynamics to arise from the DN (with the vmPFC 
being the most robust initiating region), whereas a context that requires an outward focus drives 
neural dynamics to emanate from the SN (with the IFG being the most reliable lead-off area). 
Taken together, the clearly distinct functional profiles of the DN and SN suggest that, while 
the two networks similarly show a distaste for tasks requiring non-meaningful sensory-motoric 
processing, they diverge along an ‘internal vs. external’ neurocognitive dimension, with the 
DN being more inwardly-biased and the SN more outwardly-biased. Below we discuss our 
findings under the framework of recent proposals concerning a macro-scale gradient that span 
across the entire cerebral zones. 
 
The evolution of our definition of the broad default system. As discussed above, early hypotheses 
discredit the potential function that the broad DN serves in goal-directed behaviour and instead 
postulate that it is associated with off-task mind-wandering and lapses during a task (e.g., 
Raichle et al. 2001). Such ‘task-negative’ or ‘hindrance’ views have been challenged by the 
robust observations that many goal-driven introspective processes positively engage various 
regions of the traditional ‘task-negative’ network to differential degrees (e.g., Spreng and 
Grady 2010). Recent findings have further shown that the extent of elaborated details that one 
maintains in working memory, be it visuospatial or semantic in nature, is coded by the 
multivoxel pattern of various DN and SN regions (Sormaz et al. 2018; Turnbull et al. 2019), 
and that the activity of DN and SN both ramps up when a task becomes less reliant upon 
perceptual input and more upon contents of working memory (even when the content is purely 
visuospatial, although semantic content elicits greater activity; Murphy et al. 2018; Murphy, 
Wang, et al. 2019). These results have led to the contemporary accounts that the brain is 
equipped with adaptive machinery, implemented by the DN and SN, that support cognition 
when it has to rely on internally-constructed representations and external stimuli are useless or 
unavailable (Wang et al. 2020). Care should be taken when interpreting the novel evidence 
about the DN/SN’s role in supporting the working memory of visuospatial stimuli, given the 
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fact that the choice of baseline affects the presence and absence of DN/SN activation. While a 
direct contrast of one-back visual working memory against visual perception reveals DN/SN 
activation (e.g., Murphy et al. 2019), the system might become deactivated (i) when one-back 
working memory is compared against resting periods (owing to detailed inner thoughts more 
probable to arise during rest; see Visser et al. 2010) or (ii) when strenuous two- or three-back 
working memory is pitted against effortless zero-back/visual perception (i.e., the regular 
observation of difficulty-induced deactivation; Anticevic et al. 2010). A challenge for future 
research is to clarify how multiple determinants (internal/external focus, task difficulty, extent 
of detailed contents) jointly modulate the activity of DN/SN. Taken together, the field’s 
continually evolving definition of the system signifies the significant progress made. In this 
context, our current findings reveal various situations wherein the DN and SN have differential 
preferences, providing important clues about the system’s accurate characterisation. 
 
Large-Scale Gradational Structure of the Human Cortex. Recent advances in mapping the human 
cortex have discovered a clear gradient of structural and functional features that spans across 
the sensory-motoric system and the multimodal system, found in both humans and non-human 
primates (Margulies et al. 2016; Huntenburg, Bazin and Margulies 2017; Vidaurre et al. 2017; 
Dixon et al. 2018; Kernbach et al. 2018; Oligschläger et al. 2019). An evident neurocognitive 
dimension of ‘internal vs. external preference’ underlies this cortical gradient – on one extreme 
of the spectrum, the cortical regions are highly modality-specific (e.g., the primary 
visual/auditory cortex; Margulies et al. 2016), respond to external events occurring here and 
now (i.e., showing narrow spatiotemporal receptive fields; Baldassano et al. 2017), and prefers 
concrete, perceivable stimuli to abstracted, conceptual stimuli (de Heer et al. 2017). Regions 
on the other extreme of the spectrum (e.g., the core DN areas; Margulies et al. 2016), on the 
contrary, exhibit the opposite characteristics – multimodal, able to represent information across 
long spatial and temporal extents, and sensitive to conceptual-mnemonic stimuli. Juxtaposed 
between the polar extremes are multiple intermediate zones, such as the SN that leans towards 
the DN extreme, the dorsal-attention system that leans towards the sensory-motoric extreme 
(Dixon et al. 2017), and the frontoparietal control system that situated midway between the 
two ends (Spreng et al. 2010). Within the frontoparietal control system, recent evidence has 
demonstrated that this middle ground further fractionates into two sectors: one subsystem 
preferentially coupled with the attention and sensorimotor systems, and the other subsystem 
preferentially linked with the DN and SN (Dixon et al. 2018). A similar bipartite split was also 
found in the dorsal attention network (de Heer et al. 2017). In the present study, we provide 
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crucial evidence that delineates the fine-grained fractionation within the high-level cerebral 
territory by revealing the commonalities and, more importantly, the striking distinctions in the 
functional profiles of the DN and SN. Our findings echo with recent evidence that, while the 
exact spatial arrangement of different functional networks is configured in an idiosyncratic, 
locally interdigitated manner in each individual’s brain, a clear ‘motif’ (cf. Braga and Buckner, 
2017; Braga et al., 2019) of bipartite dissociation is consistently observed in multiple networks, 
producing a gradational tapestry-like structure across the entire brain (Braga and Buckner 2017; 
Braga et al. 2019; DiNicola et al. 2020). 
 
Underpinning of the Gradient Structure. Various hypotheses have been proposed regarding the 
mechanisms that drive the formation of the cortical gradient of the human brain. One potential 
root cause might be the cytoarchitecture and myeloarchitecture of the cortical sheet (for review, 
see Huntenburg, Bazin and Margulies 2017). For instance, it has been shown that cortices of 
the sensory-motoric system contain higher numbers of neurons but relatively fewer synaptic 
connections between cells whereas the multimodal system (e.g., the DN or prefrontal cortex) 
contains fewer neurons but more synapses (Collins et al. 2010). The level of myelination also 
differs; sensory-motoric regions are more myelinated (hence, permitting swift conduction of 
information flow and prompt response to external stimuli) whereas higher-order regions are 
less myelinated and requires longer time to process (Huntenburg, Bazin, Goulas, et al. 2017). 
In addition, studies based on diffusion tractography (Binney et al. 2012; Bajada et al. 2019) 
and large-scale connectome database (de Wael et al. 2018) have coherently identified a profile 
of graded connectivity that the SN and DN are transmodal zones where multiple circuitries 
progressively converge, receiving inputs from various primary-sensory and intermediate zones. 
Such structural-anatomical evidence suggests a possibility that, although many regions of the 
SN are often incorporated into the canonical umbrella term ‘default-mode system’, these 
regions might have different cyto- and myelo-structures and connectivity profiles, which make 
the SN behaves differently from the core regions of the DN on a variety of tasks as we 
demonstrate here. One possibility could be that, while both the DN and SN are situated on the 
multimodal end of the gradient, there is relatively shorter ‘distance’ (in terms of the length of 
graph metric) from the SN to the sensory-motoric cortices. This could make the SN more 
responsive to external sensory stimuli, compared to the DN that has longer, more convoluted 




Integration between semantic cognition with default-mode processes. Brain regions that support 
different aspects of semantic cognition have long been studied separately from the regions 
engaged during resting-state. Given the fact that default-state processes recruit substantially 
overlapped areas with semantic cognition (Binder et al. 2009) and that the DN and SN are 
closely connected (Humphreys et al. 2015; Jackson et al. 2016), more crosstalk between the 
two bodies of literature is necessary. Under the framework of a macro-scale cortical gradient, 
the DN and SN could be construed as two complementary systems that work in tandem to serve 
high-level cognition. The DN areas have been shown to be maximally distant from the sensory-
motoric cortices (Margulies et al. 2016). Its locus explains why the DN sits atop the information 
processing hierarchy and represents most abstract forms of thoughts divorced from different 
input modalities (e.g., social relationships or self-related contemplation). In contrast, the 
location of the SN allows it to interface between the DN, the frontoparietal control system and 
the sensory-motoric system – which is critical to controlled semantic cognition (Lambon Ralph 
et al. 2017). The formation of generalisable, coherent concepts is known to rely upon the ATL, 
a transmodal representational hub that can interface with all verbal and sensory-motoric 
modalities simultaneously (Lambon Ralph et al. 2017; Chiou and Lambon Ralph 2019).  In 
addition, for controlled semantic processing, the semantic representational system needs to 
interface with executive control mechanisms, underpinned by the IFG and pMTG, in order to 
generate contextually appropriate behaviours (Chiou et al. 2018). Presumably, the DN and SN 
work together when the context entails goal-directed cognitive operation that combines self-
referential processing with semantic knowledge, as in the retrieval of autobiographical memory.  
 
Conclusion. In the present study, we report a series of fMRI findings that manifest a clear-cut 
bipartite split in the functional profiles between the DN and SN, evident both in their response 
amplitudes to different situations and neural dynamics. These discoveries are consistent with 
recent theories regarding a macro-scale cortical gradient that encompasses the entire cerebrum. 
The bipartite split on  multiple inter-related functional spectrums (inwardly-directed, self-
referential, abstract, multimodal, disengaged from the immediate and perceptible environment 
vs. outwardly-directed, other-referential, concrete, unimodal, engaged in the immediate and 
perceptible stimuli) indicates the crucial need that understanding the relationship between the 
DN and SN, as well as their relationship with other functional networks, requires more 
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Fig. 1. (A) Brain regions showing significantly greater activity for mind-wandering (rest), 
compared to the visuospatial control task, thresholded at p < 0.05 (FWE-corrected for whole-
brain voxel intensity). Significant clusters in Experiment 1 (green), Experiment 2 (blue), and 
their conjunctions (cyan). (B) ROI-analysis of the dmPFC vs. vmPFC. Note that negative beta 
weight means more active for mind-wandering (rest), compared to the visuospatial control 
tasks. (C) ROI-analysis of the three core DN areas (the vmPFC, PCC, and AG), as well as the 
three core SN areas (the ATL, IFG, and pMTG). See SI for the locations of ROIs that are 








Fig. 2. (A) Brain regions showing significantly greater activity for the two types of self-related 
tasks: the self-concept evaluation task (red), for the autobiographical memory task (yellow), 
and their conjunctions (orange). All contrasts were against the baseline of mind-wandering 
(rest), thresholded at p < 0.05 (FWE-corrected for whole-brain voxel intensity). (B) ROI-
analysis reveals an interaction between brain regions (dmPFC vs. vmPFC) and the types of 
self-related tasks (self-concept vs. autobiographical memory). (C) ROI-analysis of the three 
core DN areas (the vmPFC, PCC, and AG), as well as the three core SN areas (the ATL, IFG, 
and pMTG). (D) The significant interaction between the two networks and the two types of 
self-processing. (E) The six ROIs ranked by their preference for autobiographical memory over 
self-concept, with all of the three DN regions showing a noticeably greater preference than all 














Fig. 3. All contrasts were thresholded at p< 0.05 (FWE-corrected for whole-brain voxels). The 
upper row illustrates the contrast of (left to right) ‘self-knowledge > visuospatial task’, ‘self-
knowledge > other-referential knowledge’, and ‘self-knowledge > resting-state baseline’. Note 
that the choice of baseline affects the size of vmPFC cluster, with the rest-baseline engaging 
the vmPFC most, the visuospatial-baseline engaging the vmPFC least, and the other-baseline 
being intermediate. A highly similar pattern is found in the contrast of (lower-row, left to right) 
‘Rest > Visuospatial’, ‘Rest > Other’, and ‘Rest > Self’, indicating that mind-wandering (rest) 
equally engages the vmPFC as self-knowledge. The image follows the neurological convention 







Fig. 4. (A) A direct comparison between the two introspective tasks reveals the regions showing 
significantly greater activity for the autobiographical task (yellow clusters: Autobiographical 
Memory > Theory of Mind) and for the mentalising task (red clusters: Theory of Mind > 
Autobiographical Memory). Statistics are thresholded at thresholded at p < 0.05 (FWE-
corrected for whole-brain voxel intensity). In addition to the key finding that we elaborate in 
the main text (i.e., greater DN activity during autobiographical memory vs. greater SN activity 
during theory of mind), it is noteworthy that, in the mentalising task, participants simulate the 
thoughts/feelings of the protagonist in the photograph while viewing/interpreting the semantic 
meaning of the visual scene. This is a multifaceted operation that entails visual attention and 
scene recognition, semantic interpretation, and theory of mind. Our results – namely, the red 
clusters – reflect this multifaceted nature: Relative to the autobiographical task, the mentalising 
task imposes greater demand on visual processing, hence greater activation of the posterior 
vision- and attention-related cortices. (B) ROI-analysis reveals an interaction between brain 
regions (dmPFC vs. vmPFC) and introspective tasks (autobiographical memory vs. theory of 
mind). (C) ROI-analysis of the three core DN areas (the vmPFC, PCC, and AG), as well as the 
three core SN areas (the ATL, IFG, and pMTG). (D) The significant interaction between the 
two inferior-parietal subregions (the AG vs. TPJ) and the two types of introspective processing. 
(E) The significant interaction between the regions preferring other-referential tasks (the 
dmPFC, left TPJ, and right TPJ) and the two types of other-referential processes. Note that all 
of the ROI analyses here are based on β-weights compared against resting baseline. *** p < 













Fig. 5. (A) DCM-1: All analyses are based on the data of Experiment 1; (B) DCM-2: All 
analyses are based on the data of Experiment 2. Note that the nodes of the two DCM have the 














Fig. 6. (A) DCM-3: All analyses are based on the data of Experiment 1; (B) DCM-4: All 
analyses are based on the data of Experiment 2. Note that the nodes of the two DCM have the 














Fig. 7. (A) DCM-5: All analyses are based on the data of Experiment 1. All of the nodes belong 
to the SN. (B) DCM-6: All analyses are based on the data of Experiment 2. All of the nodes 
belong to the DN. 
 
 
